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General equilibrium theory by Arrow, Debreu and McKenzie is nowadays a cornerstone of theoretical economics and present in various elds. However, general equilibrium has also been continuously challenged. From a theoretical perspective existence, uniqueness and stability of the competitive equilibrium are crucial. Arrow and Debreu (1954) secure the existence, Debreu (1970) studies the local uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium and Scarf (1967) provides an example that the tâtonnement price adjustment mechanism is not globally stable.
Critics [see, e.g., Blaug (1980) and Kirman (1989) ] often argue that general equilibrium theory lacks empirical content. In particular they claim that testable implications of general equilibrium are missing. In this case Popperian falsication of general equilibrium theory is impossible. The common criticism is based on the aggregate excess demand function and the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem. Sonnenschein (1973) , Mantel (1974) and Debreu (1974) show that the aggregate excess demand function can have arbitrary shapes as long as Walras' Law, continuity and homogeneity of degree zero in prices is satised.
New results show that falsication is possible and not all empirical outcomes can be rationalized by the equilibrium hypotheses. The seminal contribution of Brown and Matzkin (1996) is the rst in a series of papers dealing with this issue. Building on Afriat (1967) they derive testable restrictions on the equilibrium manifold 1 introduced by Balasko (1975) . Various extensions of the Brown and Matzkin framework have been developed by Kubler (2003) for expected utility, Snyder (1999) for public goods and Carvajal (2004) for random preferences [see also Carvajal, Ray and Snyder (2004), or Chiappori et al. (2004) ].
For a long time market behavior and in particular the predictions of general equilibrium theory have also been a vivid eld of research in experimental economics. One of the rst studies is Chamberlin's (1948) market experiment in which prices and quantities failed to converge to the competitive equilibrium. In the following it was the seminal contribution of Smith (1962) to add a double-auction to Chamberlin's market environment and to show that now prices and quantities converge to the competitive equilibrium.
Moreover, early experiments showed that an individual's valuation of goods crucially depends on whether the individual already owns or intends to buy the same good. Thaler (1980) coined the term endowment eect to account for the alleged tendency of individuals to state a higher minimum (in monetary units) for which the individual is willing to sell a good than the maximum the same individual is willing to pay to buy the same good. Various authors nd support for the endowment eect [see, e.g., Knetsch (1989) , Kahnemann, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) , Kahnemann, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) , Bateman et al. (1997) or Bauer and Schmidt (2008) ] while others argue that the endowment eect is merely a result of inadequate experimental instructions [see Plott and Zeiler (2005) ] or inexperienced agents [see, e.g., Shogren et al. (1994) ]. Although this eect is still an active eld of research [see, e.g., Horowitz and McConnell (2002) or List (2004) ] the most accepted conjecture to explain this behavioral pattern is prospect theory by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) . The endowment eect has however, (to our knowledge) not been incorporated into a general equilibrium framework yet.
The aim of this paper is to introduce the possibility to model an endowment eect in a general equilibrium framework. In particular we are interested whether the endowment eect alters our understanding of classical general equilibrium results like the existence of the competitive equilibrium or Walrasian equilibrium prices. To do so, we consider an exchange market where the following main hypothesis mirrors the experimental evidence:
First selling and then buying a good does not necessarily lead to the same market state as rst buying and then selling that good.
The model is given as a set of axioms containing a real parameter called demand-supply gap. This parameter reects the main hypothesis if we assume that an individual that rst sells and than buys a good is endowed, while an individual that rst buys and then sells the good is not endowed with the good. In our framework the demand-supply gap is empirically testable. The larger the modulus of the parameter the more prevalent is the endowment eect in the market. We distinguish two cases: If the demand-supply gap is zero (symmetric case) there exists no endowment eect and the model leads to classical general equilibrium. If the demand-supply gap is not equal to zero (asymmetric case) we obtain that the dispersion of price and the dispersion of demand in the same market state are both strictly larger than zero.
In general equilibrium theory it is assumed that demand is invariant under price scaling [see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, p. 23) ]. In the asymmetric case such an assumption is not necessary. We derive a set of market invariants and show that the proposed axioms are unique to support an economically reasonable identication of these market invariants with demand and excess demand. We provide representations of price and demand as unbounded operators on an innite dimensional Hilbert space. We prove that neither can this space be nite dimensional nor can these operators be bounded. Price and demand cannot be simultaneously sharply measured and as a consequence of this eect market clearing Walrasian equilibrium prices do not exist in the asymmetric case.
The Asymmetric Market Model
We assume n ∈ N distinguishable goods that are traded in a pure exchange market. The state of the market is given by a non-zero vector ξ in a Hilbert space X with inner product denoted by ·|· . Observables are self-adjoint operators on this Hilbert space. The markets we consider satisfy the following axioms:
(MA1) The price p i of good i is a positive observable on X for all goods
In our nal axiom (and denition) we state the relation between price and demand.
(MA4) Prices p i and demands d j interact according to
for a xed real µ i ∈ R called the demand-supply gap.
Recall, that for observables a, b on X the commutator [a, b] is dened as [a, b] := ab − ba on the appropriate domain and the Kronecker symbol is dened as
are denoted by p, d and ω respectively. A market is called asymmetric if it satises the above four axioms with µ i = 0 for at least one good i.
With the fourth axiom we model that buying and selling of goods is exchangeable for dierent goods while if we buy and sell the same good, the dierence of exchange is measured by the operator iµ i p i . Let us digress for a moment and examine what possible right-hand sides R(p i ) in (1) are reasonable for our investigations. Such a reasonable right-hand side must surely satisfy at least two conditions. First, it has to be positively homogeneous of degree one in p i (i.e., R(µp i ) = µR(p i ) for all µ ≥ 0) to secure independence of price scaling. Second, it has to be formally skew-adjoint (i.e. R(p i )ξ|ζ = ξ| − R(p i )ζ on the appropriate domain) as can be seen as follows by considering the adjoint of equation (1):
The operator iµ i p i is the simplest possible right-hand side to satisfy these two conditions and is therefore a natural choice for our purpose. Measurement of an observable, e.g. the price of good i, in a market in state ξ (e.g. in this case selling a small quantity of good i) will result in a jump of the market into a new state ζ being an eigenvector of the observable.
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The outcome of the measurement will be a real number ζ i (e.g. the price), the eigenvalue of the observable corresponding to ζ with probability
For an observable a on X one can show that its mean value at state ξ ∈ X is given as
The dispersion of an observable a on X is given as
3 Market Invariants
The main purpose of this section is to derive the market invariants of the asymmetric market under price-scaling. For that purpose, let (U i (α)) 0<α∈R be a strongly continuous family of unitary operators on X such that
i.e., the following diagram commutes
The family U i (·) satises the following properties for all α > 0 and β > 0:
This yields T i to be a strongly continuous group of unitary operators acting on X. Thus, the theorem of Stone [see e.g. Engel and Nagel (2000) ] ensures the existence of a skew-adjoint generator A i . Set α = e t and with U (α) = T (ln α) it follows that
(2) Since a generator commutes with the strongly continuous group it generates it is easily seen that β i A i +γ i id X also commutes with U i (α) for any β i , γ i ∈ C. Hence β i A i + γ i id X represents a market invariant under price-scaling. Before we give β i A i + γ i id X an economic meaning we further analyse A i .
The assertion follows immediately. ♦ Since A i is skew-adjoint its possible eigenvalues would be purely imaginary. The Lemma then implies that A i does not have eigenvectors and eigenvalues. Moreover, the underlying Hilbert space X is innite dimensional. Proof. Assume [A, B] = A and as induction hypothesis [A n , B] = nA n .
Since p i is positive the lemma is applicable and hence, at least one of the operators p i and A i is unbounded.
Economic Interpretation
Now we derive an economic interpretation of A i . We know already that β i A i + γ i id X represents a market invariant under price-scaling for any β i , γ i ∈ C. Since A i is skew-adjoint and β i A i + γ i id X needs to be an observable, we get that β i = iµ i and γ i = ω i for some µ i , ω i ∈ R. Furthermore, since scaling of one price does not inuence scaling of the others (i.e., [p i , U j (α)] = 0 for i = j) we can use (2) and obtain
The operator iµ i A i + ω i id X is an observable, satises the same commutator relations as d i respectively z i and is invariant under price-scaling. Economic intuition therefore leads us to identify this operator with the demand respectively excess demand for good i if µ i = 0. The real parameter ω i is identied as endowment. The other real parameter µ i , the demand-supply gap, represents a new feature. Intuitively it measures the dierence of rst selling and then buying a good versus rst buying and then selling that good. In the case µ i = 0, i.e., in classical general equilibrium theory, this existence result for market invariants generally has to be taken as an assumption [see, e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, p. 23)].
So far we have seen that in the case µ = 0 at least one of the observables p i and d i cannot be bounded. This fact vaguely resembles quantum theory, where position and momentum operators cannot simultaneously be bounded [see Wielandt (1949) ]. Albeit, one must emphasize, that the reason for this unboundedness lies in the corresponding commutator relations and these relations are quite dierent, [A, B] = A in our axiomatic framework and [A, B] = id X in quantum theory. From a purely axiomatic viewpoint one might ask why this is the case. Since in economics we need demand invariance under price-scaling the right-hand side of (MA4) has to be, at least formally, positively homogeneous of degree one in p i . Furthermore, by considering the adjoint of (1) a reasonable right-hand side has to be, at least formally, a skewadjoint operator. Under the assumptions that the right-hand side is, e.g. a formal power series in p i , the form iµ i p i we have chosen in (MA4) is unique. Hence, the system of axioms (MA1) -(MA4) is the only one satisfying the economic intuition of demand invariance under price-scaling. In quantum physics the intuition is that momentum is invariant under translation of position. To achieve this the right-hand side in the respective commutator relation can be chosen independent of position and momentum. Under the assumption that the right-hand side is, e.g. a formal power series one can
show that iµid X is unique to satisfy intuition and t experimental evidence.
If one now compares both right-hand sides, i.e., iµ i p i and iµid X , one observes that we do not propose the existence of a demand-supply gap independent of the goods under consideration. To the knowledge of the authors there is so far no experimental evidence for such a claim. That fact and the dependence on the individual price make things, at least formally, more complicated in axioms (MA1) -(MA4) compared to the corresponding axioms from quantum theory.
We close this section by providing a representation for the observables p i , d i and z i on an appropriate Hilbert space. The results in the previous section, lead to the following approach: The Hilbert space is given as X = L 2 (R n ). For a vector x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n and a function ξ ∈ X the demand d i : D(d i ) → X is given as a dierential operator The excess demand operator z i = d i − ω i id X has the same domain as d i . Dene the function e i : R n → R as e i (x) = e x i . Then, the price operator p i : D(p i ) → X is given as a multiplication operator
All operators p i , d i , z i are self-adjoint, p i is positive, the commutator satises
and thus the market axioms are fulllled.
Observability
Since we assumed in (MA4) that p i and d i do not necessarily commute there is no simultaneous sharp measurement. Thus wealth (i.e., classically n i=1 p i d i ) cannot be observed in a precise sense, and actually cannot even be dened in a naive way. That is a consequence of the fact that in asymmetric markets you cannot simultaneously keep the good and determine its price. You have to sell the good to determine its price and thus you change your wealth level. This interaction cannot be circumvented. Moreover, we derive the following Proposition 3.
For a market in state ξ the dispersions of p i and d i satisfy
In the asymmetric case µ i = 0, the right-hand side is strictly larger than zero.
Proof. Since dispersion and mean do not depend on the norm of a state we can, without loss of generality, assume that ξ = 1 and obtain
and since the rst term is positive
Now (1) and the fact that positive oberservables have a square root yields the nal inequality
can only be zero if µ i is zero the proposition is proved. ♦ As a consequence of this proposition we obtain that wealth cannot be 13 measured sharply and hence is not observable. Therefore, there are diculties to dene classical budget sets restricting the consumption alternatives of agents to a given wealth level. The following observable
represents wealth in asymmetric markets and reduces to the usual denition for µ i = 0. Then the budget set for a price p and a wealth level 0 ≤ w ∈ R can be dened as the following set of demands
Classically one now introduces preference relations or utility functions u and solves the maximization problem. (p, w, ξ) of this problem is called a Walrasian demand function.
In the symmetric case a straightforward compactness argument yields existence of Walrasian demand functions under suitable general assumtions on the utility function. In the asymmetric case it is sucient for our purposes to assume existence for the remainder of this section. Now given such a Walrasian demand function d (p, w, ξ) the Walrasian excess demand function is dened as
where W (p, ω) ξ measures wealth provided through endowment. Now, under suitable assumptions on the utility function the Walrasian equilibrium price vector p w clears all markets, i.e.,
for all goods i with 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, in a Walrasian equilibrium state ξ the demand d i of a good is xed to be the endowment ω i and hence its dispersion satises ( d i ) 2 ξ = 0. Proposition 3 now implies µ i = 0 and the main result of this section.
Theorem 5. In an asymmetric exchange market Walrasian equilibrium prices do not exist.
As one could see in the derivation of this result, even in the symmetric case, there are several necessary assumptions to obtain the existence of an equilibrium. Key to the argumentation usually is that the relation between price and demand is rst a function and has second further properties like continuity or negative derivative. While there seems to be sucent experimental evidence for the function property, the other properties are often relaxed [see, e.g., Hart (1975) for a singular non-existence and Momi (2001) for a generic non-existence result] and no equilibrium is found. Markets without equilibrium are thus a vivid eld of research. Theorem 5 now ts into this framework as follows: Relation (1) between price and demand is only just sucient to model an endowment eect and to obtain reasonable market invariants under price-scaling. However, it implies Theorem 5 and thus excludes the existence of an equilibrium for any choice of utility. In other words, as long as there is an endowment eect in the market, one can choose an arbitrarily tame relation between price and demand and will still not get an equilibrium. Combining this with the results of the prior sections we obtain our nal assertion. The non-existence of an equilibrium price in an asymmetric market does not necessarily come from a bad choice of utility or a bad choice of preference, it originates from the endowment eect.
Conclusion
Our axiomatic framework for exchange markets is complementary to classical approaches. If the endowment eect is suciently small, i.e. if the modulus of µ i is suciently small in equation (1), the asymmetric market is very likely in 15 a market state which can under suitable assumptions be approximated by the Walrasian equilibrium of the corresponding symmetric market. However, if we consider an asymmetric market with a large demand-supply gap, i.e. , the endowment eect is prevalent, our results dier from what one would expect from classical general equilibrium theory. In contrast to general equilibrium theory we obtain: First, demand invariance under price-scaling has not to be assumed. We show that the proposed axioms for an exchange economy are unique to support an economically reasonable identication of the market invariants with demand and excess demand. Second, our representations of price and demand are unbounded operators on an innite dimensional Hilbert space. We prove that neither can this space be nite dimensional nor can these operators be bounded. Third, there is no Walrasian equilibrium.
Our results indicate that classical general equilibrium theory may actually be seen as a valid framework in the context of symmetric or asymmetric markets with a suciently small demand-supply gap. However, this is not the case for asymmetric markets with a suciently large demand-supply gap.
